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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I examine the impacts of trade and investment liberalization on the wage structure of
Mexico. Part one of the paper surveys recent literature on the labor-market consequences of
Mexico’s economic reforms in the 1980?s. Mexico’s policy reforms appear to have raised the
demand for skill in the country, reduced rents in industries that prior to reform paid their workers
high wages, and raised the premium paid to workers in states along the U.S. border. These changes
have resulted in an increase in wage dispersion in the country. Part two of the paper examines
changes in Mexico’s wage structure during the 1990's. In the last decade, Mexico has experienced
rising returns to skill, which mirror closely wage movements in the United States. There is, however,
little evidence of wage convergence between the two countries. Regional wage differentials in
Mexico have widened and appear to be explained largely by variation in regional access to foreign
trade and investment and in regional opportunities for migration to the United States. I discuss
implications of Mexico’s experience for the rest of Latin America in the event a Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas is enacted.
Gordon H. Hanson
IR/PS
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive




  The proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) would alter 
dramatically trading relationships in the Western Hemisphere.  Eliminating trade barriers 
within the region would, among other effects, induce economies to specialize more in 
export production.  Such specialization would enable countries in Latin America to 
realize gains from trade, but these income gains would likely not be shared equally by all 
individuals in society.  In Brazil, for instance, farmers growing oranges or workers 
producing shoes would likely benefit more from an FTAA than would capital-intensive 
manufacturers.  As a result, an FTAA would be likely to redistribute national incomes in 
the region.  Latin America’s long history of income inequality makes the impact of an 
FTAA on the distribution of earnings an important issue for policymakers. 
  In this paper, I use Mexico as a test case for how regional free trade affects labor 
earnings.  I examine how trade reform in Mexico, and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in particular, has altered the country’s wage structure.  Mexico is a 
useful case to study because it has opened itself to trade aggressively.  It unilaterally 
liberalized foreign trade and investment policies in the 1980’s and then enacted NAFTA 
in 1994, which further reduced trade barriers and helped lock in reform by enshrining it 
in a multilateral treaty.  Mexico is now as closely tied to the North American economy as 
at any point in its history.  In 2000, it sent 88.7% of its exports to and bought 73.1% of its 
imports from the United States.  Greater openness has helped increase the share of trade 
in Mexico’s GDP from 11.2% in 1980 to 32.2% in 2000. 
  There are several channels through which North American economic integration 
impacts Mexico’s labor market.  One is by equalizing the price of traded goods between   2
economies.  Trade theory predicts that convergence in goods’ prices between countries 
creates pressure for convergence in factor prices.  In Mexico, this would affect both wage 
levels and the relative wages of low- and high-skilled labor.  An additional channel 
through which trade reform may shock labor demand is through its impact on capital 
flows.  Given that capital appears to complement skilled labor, capital inflows may 
increase the demand for skill.  In Mexico, NAFTA appears to have raised capital inflows 
in part by raising investor confidence in the country’s commitment to free trade.  From 
1980 to 1994, foreign direct investment (FDI) average 1.3% of Mexico’s GDP, while 
from 1995 to 2000, it averaged 2.8% of GDP (Chiquiar 2001).  About two-thirds of this 
FDI comes from the United States.  In Mexico’s export assembly sector, capital inflows 
expand trade directly.   The creation of export assembly plants, or maquiladoras, by U.S. 
firms in Mexico has increased trade in intermediate inputs.  In 2000, maquiladoras 
accounted for 47.7% of Mexico’s exports and 35.4% of Mexico’s imports.   
  In using Mexico to preview the effects of an FTAA, it is important to recognize 
that it differs from the rest of Latin America in some important respects.  In particular, 
Mexico shares a land border with the United States that creates opportunities for 
migration abroad that other countries do not enjoy.  During the 1990’s, net immigration 
from Mexico in the United States was about 400,000 individuals per year.  In the absence 
of migration flows, trade reform in Mexico might have generated even more trade and 
FDI than has occurred.  Any estimate of the impact of regional free trade on Mexico, 
then, may understate the impact an FTAA would have on the rest of the region. 
  The body of the paper has two parts.  In part one, I examine changes in Mexico’s 
wage structure following reforms in the 1980’s.  Here, I rely on a substantial body of   3
research that examines the impact of specific policy changes on labor earnings.  This 
work finds that lower barriers to foreign trade and investment have changed Mexico’s 
wage structure.  The evidence suggests that tariff reductions have increased relative 
wages for skilled workers, increased foreign investment has raised the relative demand 
for skilled labor, and tariff and quota reductions have altered inter-industry wage 
differentials.  Mexico’s economic opening thus appears to have raised the skill premium 
and reduced industry rents going to labor.  It also appears to have increased wages in 
states along the U.S. border relative to the rest of the country.     
  In part two of the paper, I use data from the 1990 and 2000 Mexico population 
census to examine changes in Mexican wages over the period during which NAFTA was 
implemented.  During the 1990’s in Mexico, the returns to skill continued to rise and 
regional differences in wages continued to widen.  Wage gains were largest in regions 
most exposed to international trade, FDI, and/or opportunities for migration to the United 
States.  After controlling for regional exposure to globalization, other regional 
characteristics appear to be unimportant in explaining wage changes.  Overall, wage 
gains were largest for more-educated workers living close to the United States and 
smallest for less-educated workers living in the country’s south.  There is little evidence 
of convergence in wages between Mexico and the United States.  I conclude the paper by 
discussing the implications of these results for an FTAA. 
 
POLICY CHANGE AND WAGES IN MEXICO:  THE FIRST REFORM WAVE 
  The last two decades in Mexico have not been a quiet period.  Since 1980, the 
country has had three currency crises, bouts of high inflation, and severe macroeconomic   4
contractions.  The reform of the country’s trade and investment policies has been, in part, 
a response to this turmoil.  Following a balance of payments crisis in 1982, the country 
eased restrictions on maquiladoras.  In 1985, Mexico joined the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT), which entailed cutting tariffs and eliminating many non-tariff 
barriers.  In 1989, Mexico eased restrictions on the rights of foreigners to own assets in 
the country.  In 1994, NAFTA consolidated and extended these reforms and tied them to 
reciprocal access to the U.S. and Canadian markets.  Concomitant with its economic 
opening, Mexico privatized state-owned enterprises, deregulated entry restrictions in 
many industries, and used wage and price restraints to combat inflation. 
The policy shocks to Mexico’s labor markets have attracted much academic 
attention.  A large body of work examines the impact that these policy changes have had 
on wages in the country.  In this section, I briefly survey the literature.  I organize the 
discussion around three questions:  (i) Why have skill premia in Mexico risen?  (ii) Has 
greater economic openness affected regional wage differences in Mexico?  And, (iii) is 
there evidence of labor-market integration between Mexico and the United States? 
 
Rising Skill Premia in Mexico 
Relative to the United States, Mexico has abundant supplies of less-skilled labor 
and scarce supplies of human and physical capital.  Trade and investment reforms would 
be likely to alter the relative demand for labor of different types, producing changes in 
the premium for skill.  Recent research shows that Mexico has indeed experienced 
changes in the relative wages of skilled workers, but ones that are quite different from 
what many would have expected given Mexico’s relative factor supplies.   5
  Since the mid 1980’s, Mexico has experienced widening wage inequality 
associated with rising returns to skill.  Cragg and Epelbaum (1996) show that between 
1987 and 1993, though average real wages rose by 30%, the wages of urban workers with 
a primary education (grade six completed) fell relative to the wages of urban workers 
with secondary education (completed grade nine) by 15% and relative to the wages of 
urban workers with post-secondary education by 60%.  The returns to labor-market 
experience also rose markedly over this time period.  Skill premia continued to rise in the 
1990’s.  Robertson (2001) finds that the annual return to schooling for urban workers 
rose from 0.035 in 1987 to 0.05 in 1994 and to 0.07 in 1998.  Consistent with evidence 
that skill premia and average educational attainment among workers have increased 
simultaneously, Cragg and Epelbaum (1995) suggest that Mexico’s rising skill premium 
is due mostly to increases in the relative demand for skill. 
  Why has the relative demand for skilled labor in Mexico risen?  The literature 
proposes a several answers to this question.  The one that has attracted the most attention 
is that rising skill premia are due to trade and investment liberalization.  Attributing rising 
skill premia to trade reform may seem counterintuitive, given Mexico’s presumed 
comparative advantage in low-skill activities (Leamer, 1993).  The natural expectation 
might be that skill premia in Mexico would fall, not rise, after liberalization.
1 
This line of reasoning, however, does not accord with the pattern of trade 
protection in Mexico before reform.  At the time Mexico began to lower its trade barriers, 
labor-intensive sectors had the highest tariff barriers.  Hanson and Harrison (1999) find 
that 1984 industry tariffs are negatively correlated with the 1984 industry ratio of white-
                                                 
1 See Robbins (1995) for a cross-country comparison of changes in wage inequality following trade reform.   6
collar to blue-collar employment and that the 1984-1990 change in industry tariffs is 
positively correlated with this employment ratio.  This suggests that trade protection was 
initially higher in less-skill intensive sectors and was reduced by more in these sectors 
during reform.  If these tariff changes were passed through to changes in goods’ prices, 
then the logic of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem (1941) would imply that the relative 
wage of skilled labor would have risen.  Robertson (2001) suggests that this is exactly 
what happened.  He finds that over the period 1987-1993 the relative price of skill-
intensive goods in Mexico rose and that the tariff-induced change in relative prices had 
the effect of raising the relative wage for white-collar labor.  Interestingly, tariff 
reductions in Mexico due to NAFTA have been larger in more-skill intensive sectors, 
suggesting that the final stage of trade reform may halt the increase in skill premia. 
In related work, Feliciano (2001) finds that between 1986 and 1990 wage 
dispersion in Mexico rose more in tradables than in non-tradables.  She also finds that 
trade reform altered inter-interindustry wage differentials.  Industry wage premia fell 
more in industries with larger reductions in import-license requirements, but not in 
industries with larger reductions in tariffs.  Consistent with these results, Revenga (1997) 
finds that over the period 1984-1990 manufacturing plants in industries with larger 
reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers had higher reductions in employment.  These 
findings suggest that industries that enjoyed high rents before trade reform, as indicated 
by high average wages after controlling for observable worker characteristics, 
experienced relatively large reductions in wages and employment after trade reform. 
  Another mechanism through which trade and investment reform may have 
increased the demand for skilled labor in Mexico is outsourcing to the country by foreign   7
firms.  A large fraction of U.S.-Mexico trade in manufactured products is the result of 
U.S. firms establishing maquiladoras in Mexico.  These plants import nearly all parts and 
components from the United States, assemble final goods in Mexico, and export most 
output back to the United States.  In 1995, exports by maquiladoras accounted for 40.2% 
of all Mexican exports to the United States.
2  From 1980 to 1997, the maquiladora share 
of national manufacturing employment in Mexico rose from 5.6% to 25.1%.  The plants 
are concentrated in Mexican states on the U.S. border.
3 
  How has the growth of maquiladoras affected labor demand in Mexico?  Feenstra 
and Hanson (1997) show that in theory if policy reform allows U.S. firms to outsource 
more production to Mexico, these firms will choose to move the least skill-intensive 
activities that they perform.  By moving low-skill activities to Mexico, the average skill 
intensity of production would rise in both the United States and Mexico.  This would 
raise the relative demand and earnings of high-skilled workers in both countries, 
contributing to a binational increase in wage inequality.  
  To test these predictions, Feenstra and Hanson (1997) examine whether the 
relative demand for skilled workers in Mexico has risen more in regions where foreign 
investment has been concentrated.  They use regional data on maquiladoras to measure 
the spatial distribution of foreign direct investment in Mexico.  Consistent with their 
                                                 
2 Most maquiladoras assemble one of three types of goods, apparel, electronics, or auto parts.  In 1995, 
these three industries accounted for 80.5% of total exports by maquiladoras to the United States. 
3  It is often asserted that the growth of maquiladoras was the result of special trade advantages afforded to 
goods produced by these plants on their entry into the United States.   Tariffs are levied only on the value 
added abroad (i.e., in Mexico) and not on the value of the U.S. inputs used in the assembly of the goods.  
Mexican firms that use domestically-produced inputs enjoy no such advantage.  An alternative view is that 
maquiladoras have expanded in part because Mexico, given its relative abundance of low-wage labor, has a 
comparative advantage in assembly-type activities (rather than in entire industries).  Since NAFTA was 
implemented in 1994, maquiladoras have lost their special trade advantages in most industries.  Yet, until 
2000 maquiladoras continued to grow faster than any other sector in the economy.  This suggests that their 
initial trade advantages relative to other firms in Mexico cannot fully account for their growth.   8
theory, during the 1980’s the relative demand for high-skilled workers was higher in 
regions where maquiladoras expanded most rapidly.  Maquiladora growth can account for 
over 50% of the increase in the skilled labor wage share that occurred during the late 
1980's.  These results suggest that U.S. outsourcing to Mexico, in the form of creating 
maquiladoras, has contributed to rising in wage inequality in the country. 
Beyond the specific activity of outsourcing, FDI in general is likely to affect the 
level and structure of wages in Mexico.  Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1996) find that, 
controlling for plant, industry, and region characteristics, manufacturing plants that are 
foreign owned pay their skilled workers 21.5% more and their unskilled workers 3.3% 
more than plants that are domestically owned.  Similar results hold for Venezuela.  These 
results are consistent with several interpretations.  Workers may be more productive in 
multinational firms, multinationals may attract more able workers, or multinationals may 
earn rents and share these rents with their workers.  
 
Regional Wage Differences in Mexico 
  Mexico's proximity to the United States suggests that trade liberalization for the 
country was tantamount to economic integration with its northern neighbor.  Given 
northern Mexico enjoys relatively low-cost access to the U.S. market, we would expect 
that North American economic integration would raise the demand for labor in the region 
relative to the rest of the country.  Hanson (1996, 1997) examines how trade reform has 
affected Mexico’s regional economies.  Following trade reform, there has been a decline 
in relative industrial activity in central Mexico and an expansion in northern Mexico.  In 
1980, five years before trade reform began, 46% of the Mexico's manufacturing labor   9
force was located in the Mexico City area and 21% was located in states on the U.S. 
border (Hanson 1997).  In 1993, after eights years of reform, the share of manufacturing 
activity in Mexico City had fallen to 29% and the share at the border had risen to 30%.  
By 1998, four years after NAFTA, Mexico City’s employment share had fallen further to 
23% and the border’s employment share had risen to 34% (Chiquiar 2001). 
Movements in regional relative wages also suggest North American economic 
integration has benefited northern Mexico disproportionately.  Hanson (1996) estimates 
state manufacturing wages relative to national manufacturing wages as a function of 
distance to Mexico City (the largest market in the country prior to trade reform) and 
distance to the United States (the largest market for the country’s goods after trade 
reform).  Regional relative wages are negatively correlated with distance to Mexico City 
and with distance to the Mexico-U.S. border.  Prior to trade reform, a 10% increase in 
distance from Mexico City was associated with a 1.9% decrease in the relative state 
nominal wage, and a 10% increase in distance from the Mexico-U.S. border was 
associated with a 1.3% decrease in the relative state nominal wage.  After trade reform, 
the regional wage gradient shifts.  The effect of distance from Mexico City on state 
wages weakens and the effect of distance from the United States strengthens.   
In related work, Chiquiar (2001) finds that for the period 1970-1985 there was 
convergence in per capita GDP levels across Mexican states, but that after 1985 this 
process broke down.  For the period 1985-1993, there is strong divergence in state per 
capita GDP levels and for the period 1993-1998 relative state GDP levels remain roughly 
constant.  The divergence in regional growth occurs at the time of trade reform.   10
The experience of Mexico suggests that trade policy plays an important role in 
determining regional economic fortunes.  While trade reform raises wages in Mexican 
border states, it may lower wages in regions of the country that had a privileged role 
under the closed economy or that have poor access to the U.S. market.   
 
Convergence in Mexican and U.S. Wages 
Have the flows of goods, capital, and people helped integrate the labor markets of 
Mexico and the United States?  In one of the few papers to address the topic, Robertson 
(2000) examines whether shocks to Mexican wages are correlated with shocks to U.S. 
wages.  Using household data from the two countries over 1987-1997, Robertson takes 
mean wages by age, schooling, region of residence, and time period and constructs a 
panel of synthetic cohorts.  He then regresses the quarterly change in Mexican wages for 
a given age-education-region cell on quarterly changes in U.S. wages for the same age-
education cell and on the lagged difference in U.S. and Mexican wages for the cell.  The 
first variable captures the strength of labor-market integration between the two countries 
and the second captures the rate of wage convergence between the two countries. 
Wage changes in Mexico are positively correlated with wage changes in the 
United States.  This suggests that there is at least partial labor-market integration between 
the two countries.  A shock that raises U.S. wages by 10% would raise wages in Mexican 
interior cities by 1.8% and wages in Mexican border cities by 2.5%.  Wage changes in 
Mexico are negatively correlated with the lagged U.S.-Mexico wage difference, which 
suggests that over time wages in the two economies tend to converge.  The estimated 
convergence rates are very rapid, with equilibrium U.S.-Mexico wage differentials being   11
reached within one to two quarters.  This finding of rapid convergence seems at odds 
with rising levels of trade, investment, and migration between the two countries, which 
suggests that integration of U.S. and Mexican markets is incomplete and that wage 
convergence between the two countries would be more gradual. 
  Revenga and Montenegro (1998) offer a related analysis of U.S.-Mexico wage 
differentials.  They use data on Mexican manufacturing plants and U.S. manufacturing 
industries for 1984-1990 to examine the evolution of average industry wages in Mexico 
relative to the United States.  They regress the log ratio of average wages in Mexican 
plants to average wages in the corresponding U.S. industry on average industry tariffs in 
Mexico, average industry import license requirements in Mexico, and other controls.  The 
analysis is performed separately for less- and more-skilled workers.  The Mexico-U.S. 
wage is positively correlated with Mexican tariffs and import-license requirements.  The 
estimated regression coefficients for the sample of production workers and for the sample 
of non-production workers are very similar.  A 50% reduction in tariffs would be 
associated with a 3.7% reduction in relative Mexico-U.S. wages for less-skilled workers 
and a 4.3% reduction in relative Mexico-U.S. wages for more-skilled workers. 
  It is tempting to interpret these results to mean that trade liberalization in Mexico 
depressed wages for Mexican workers relative to their U.S. counterparts.  Were this the 
case, one might the effects on more- and less-skilled workers to be asymmetric, but they 
are not.  An alternative and more plausible interpretation is that trade barriers in Mexico 
allowed firms to earn rents, which they shared with workers in the form of higher wages.  
Trade reform would have reduced these rents, producing a positive correlation between 
trade protection in Mexico and relative Mexico-U.S. wages for all labor types.   12
Summary 
  Recent literature suggests that liberalizing barriers to trade and investment have 
contributed to changes in Mexico’s wage structure.
4  There is evidence consistent with 
tariff reductions having increased relative wages for skilled workers, increased foreign 
investment having raised the relative demand for skilled labor, and tariff and quota 
reductions having altered inter-industry wage differentials.  Mexico’s economic opening 
thus appears to have raised the demand for skill and reduced industry rents going to labor.  
Both changes appear to have had adverse consequences for low-skilled workers. 
Several larger messages also emerge from the literature.  One is that Mexico’s 
comparative advantage in low-skill activities is not as strong as many had thought.   
Mexico’s trade reform entailed larger tariff reductions in less-skill-intensive industries, 
reflecting the high levels of protection afforded these industries under import-substitution 
industrialization.  After trade reform, less-skill-intensive industries ended up taking the 
hardest hit in terms of wage and employment declines.  This may come as a surprise, 
given Mexico’s presumed comparative advantage in labor-intensive activities.  While 
Mexico may have such a comparative advantage relative to the United States, it is 
probably does not relative to China or South Asia.  Trade liberalization exposed Mexico’s 
vulnerability in very low-end manufacturing, as producers in this segment lost out to 
imports.  Replacing these producers were export assembly plants in apparel, auto parts, 
and electronics.  While Mexico may have a cost disadvantage relative to China in 
                                                 
4  There is also evidence that other reforms affected Mexico’s labor market.  During the 1980’s, real 
minimum wages declined substantially.   Bell (1997) finds that this didn’t affect formal-sector employment 
due to low initial minimum wages and non-compliance with minimum wage laws (see Feliciano, 1998, for 
evidence of stronger minimum-wage effects).  Woodruff (1998) finds that government encouragement of 
wage restraints to combat inflation in the late 1980’s had a larger impact on large firms than on small firms, 
leading to a disappearance of the employer-size wage effect.  Fairris (2002) finds that during the late 
1980’s and early 1990’s the observed increase in wage dispersion in Mexico was larger in the unionized 
sector (though lower in this sector to begin with), perhaps indicating a decline in union bargaining power.   13
finished goods like t-shirts, plastic footwear, and simple consumer electronics, it appears 
to have a cost advantage in assembly services for the U.S. economy.  Mexican 
manufacturing has, in effect, reoriented itself from producing simple consumer goods to 
being a subcontractor for the North American economy. 
A second message to emerge from the literature is that trade and FDI appear to be 
complements.  Trade reform freed up resources in manufacturing that allowed Mexico to 
become more specialized export assembly.  But to make this transition, the country 
needed FDI.  The arrival of foreign firms brought in needed capital and new technology 
for managing assembly operations and handling the logistics of importing intermediate 
inputs and exporting output.  These assembly operations, as it turns out, are intensive in 
the use of skilled labor relative to other Mexican manufacturing plants.  The combination 
of freer trade, which allowed greater specialization, and fewer restrictions on FDI, which 
allowed plants in Mexico to become part of North American production networks, 
induced in shift from low-end production for the domestic economy to the provision of 
input-processing services for the North American economy. 
 
WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT  IN MEXICO, 1990 AND 2000 
  Previous literature has focused on how Mexico’s reforms affected wages and 
employment in the country during the 1980’s and early 1990’s.  There is little work on 
the post-NAFTA period or that evaluates the relative impact of Mexico’s economic 
reforms on labor-market outcomes in the country.  In the next two sections, I attempt to 
address these shortcomings.  I study changes in Mexico’s wage structure over the period 
1990-2000.  The goals of this exercise are (a) to examine whether changes in Mexican   14
wages in the 1990’s mirrored those in the 1980’s, (b) to assess whether there has been 
convergence between U.S. and Mexican wages, and (c) to evaluate how different forms 
of economic openness have impacted Mexico’s wage structure. 
 
Data and Summary Statistics 
  The data I use for the analysis are 1% random samples from the 1990 and 2000 
Mexico population census.  Much previous research limits the analysis to the 
manufacturing sector and/or to workers in large cities and so gives only a partial view of 
how Mexico’s wage structure has evolved.  The census provides comprehensive data on 
earnings and employment in Mexico.  By looking over the entire decade of the 1990s, the 
analysis spans both the planning and negotiation period for NAFTA and the period 
following its enactment.  This helps account for the possibility that firms began adjusting 
to NAFTA before the treaty was formally approved.  It also extends the time period well 
beyond the severe recession Mexico suffered in 1995, when real GDP fell by 6.2%, 
which was precipitated by a bungled devaluation of the peso. 
  Table 1 gives summary statistics on the sample of individuals in 1990 and 2000.  
To focus on potential wage earners, I include only individuals 16-65 years old.  Over 
time, Mexico has experienced increases in educational attainment.  From 1990 to 2000, 
the share of working-age individuals with 8 years of education or less declined from 
59.3% to 47.5% for males and from 63.3% to 51.4% for females.  There are marked 
increases in the share of individuals completing secondary school (9 years) or preparatory 
school (12 years).  Despite large wage differences across regions (as discussed in the last 
section), there is little interregional migration.  The border region, which has the highest   15
wages in the country, had its share of the national population increase by only 1.0% for 
males and 0.5% for females.  Within regions, there has been rural-to-urban migration.  
The share of individuals living in cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants rose by 4.8% 
for males and 4.4% for females and the share of individuals living in localities with less 
2,500 inhabitants fell by 4.0% for males and 3.2% for females. 
  Despite increases in schooling, average hourly earnings fell in the 1990’s.  When 
deflated by Mexico’s CPI, the average hourly wage in 1990 dollars declined for males 
from $1.33 to $1.11 and for females from $1.24 to $1.13.  Wage declines are larger when 
controls are added for individual characteristics.  These wage movements reflect in part 
the effects of Mexico’s economic collapse in 1995.  Even with falling wages, labor-force 
participation rates rose modestly for males and sharply for females over the decade.  By 
2000, 30.9% of working-age women were wage earners, up from 20.7% in 1990. 
  Table 2 shows the distribution of employed individuals across industries in 1990 
and 2000.  The major change in industrial specialization over the period was a decline in 
employment in agriculture and mining.  The sector’s share of male employment fell from 
28.9% to 20.7%. due in part to the reform of the land tenure system in Mexico and the 
breakup of rural cooperatives, or ejidos.  Manufacturing’s share of total employment 
remained steady over the 1990’s at around 20%. 
 
OLS Wage Regressions, 1990 and 2000 
  To summarize changes in Mexico’s wage structure, I present results from OLS 
wage regressions.  Since most regressors in the estimation are dummy variables, these 
results summarize the conditional mean of log wages with respect to education, region,   16
industry, and other characteristics.  This is a compact way to characterize the returns to 
observable characteristics at different points in time. 
  Tables 3a and 3b present the estimation results for males and females.  The 
dependent variable is log average hourly earnings.  The independent variables are dummy 
variables for seven categories of education attainment (the excluded category is no 
schooling), age and age squared, a dummy variable for whether an individual is married, 
dummy variables for four categories of city/locality size (the excluded category is 
localities with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants), dummy variables for five regions (the 
excluded region is the South), and dummy variables for nine industries (the excluded 
sector is agriculture and mining).  To reduce the effects of measurement error, I drop 
observations with the lowest or highest 0.5% of wage values.
5  The sample is wage 
earners, 25-65 years old.  The tables report results for the full sample and excluding the 
self-employed.  In unreported regressions I find little impact of excluding those who 
work less than 20 hours per week or of further restricting extreme wage values. 
  In Table 3a, several changes in earnings for males over 1990-2000 are apparent.  
First, there is a sharp increase in the returns to high levels of schooling (but not to low or 
moderate schooling).  The returns to completing 13-15 years of schooling (the equivalent 
of some college) rose by 13.3 log points and the returns to completing 16 or more years 
of schooling (the equivalent of at least a college education) rose by 13.1 log points.  
Second, there is a decrease in returns to age.  A 30 year old received a boost in wages for 
an extra year of age of 1.7 log points in 1990 but only 1.2 log points in 2000.  Third, there 
are changes in regional wage differentials.  Between 1990 and 2000, wages in the border 
                                                 
5 The 1990 sample has a large number of observations with very low hourly wages.  To account for what 
appears to be more severe measurement error in 1990, I first drop observations (3031 in total) with wages 
below $0.006 dollars per hour, for which there is zero mass in the 2000 sample and then trim the 1% tails.   17
region rose by 8.5 log points relative to south region, while wages in other regions were 
stable relative to the south.  Fourth, there are changes in inter-industry wage differentials.  
Wages in agriculture, the excluded sector, rose relative to all industries except public 
administration and social assistance.  This may reflect the reform of agriculture.  With the 
breakup of ejidos, only relatively high-wage workers may have remained in the sector. 
  Some results are sensitive to whether or not the self-employed are included in the 
sample.  Excluding the self-employed, wages in all regions except the Yucatan rose 
relative to the south.  The border again showed the largest increase in relative wages. 
  Table 3b shows wage regressions for females.  For women, there were increases 
in returns to education at all levels, with the largest increases occurring at the highest 
schooling levels.  Wages in the south fell relative to wages in all other regions, with the 
border having the largest wage increases.  In contrast to males, females in manufacturing 
earn relatively low wages.  The results for women should be interpreted with caution.  
The large increase in female labor-force participation in the 1990’s suggests that the 
composition of females in the labor force may have changed over time.  Self-selection 
into work may introduce bias into the estimation for women. 
 
Summary 
  Wages changes in the 1990’s mirrored those in the 1980’s.  Returns to schooling 
appeared to rise, the border wage premium rose, and industry wages shifted in favor of 
agriculture.  While manufacturing employment became more concentrated in the border 
region, the border’s share of the national population increased only slightly.   18
ECONOMIC OPENNESS AND CHANGES IN MEXICO’S WAGE STRUCTURE 
  In this section, I examine the role that economic openness has played in Mexico’s 
evolving wage structure.  To do so, we need measures of shocks to the economy and to 
define groups of workers that have similar sensitivities to these shocks.  Lacking data on 
individuals over time, I construct a panel of synthetic cohorts.  For 1990 and 2000, I 
calculate average hourly earnings for individuals in the sample and then take mean wages 
for cells broken down by sex, age, education, and region.  I define cells according to four 
1990 age categories (16-25, 26-35, 36-45, and 46-55 years), seven education categories 
(0-4, 5-8, 9-11, 12, 13-15, and 16+ years of schooling), and each of Mexico’s 32 states.   
I then track wage changes for the same cohort between 1990 and 2000 (e.g., the change 
in wages between 26-35 year-old males with 12 years of education in a given state in 
1990 and 36-45 year-old males with 12 years of education in the same state in 2000). 
 
Wages Changes for Mexican and U.S. Cohorts 
The first exercise is to compare wage changes in Mexico and the United States.  
Evidence using high-frequency data in Robertson (2001) suggests that Mexico-U.S. wage 
convergence is occurring.  I revisit the issue using long-period time changes.  This 
requires constructing a matching panel of U.S. synthetic cohorts.  To do so, I use the 
1990 and 2000 Current Population Survey (for merged outgoing rotation groups).  These 
cohorts are defined for the United States as a whole for the same age and education 
categories as their Mexican counterparts.  One problem with the CPS is that it does not 
identify country of birth in 1990.  U.S. cohorts thus include both immigrant and native-
born workers.  This is unfortunate because during the 1990’s large numbers of   19
immigrants with low-education levels arrived in the United States.  Immigration changes 
the underlying population of individuals from which the CPS sample is drawn, with the 
change being largest for the cohorts with the lowest education levels. 
Table 4 summarizes changes in Mexican wages relative to changes in U.S. wages 
over the 1990’s for the panel of synthetic cohorts.  All wage changes are weighted by 
average cohort size in 1990 and 2000.  In terms of nominal dollar values, Mexican wages 
rose relative to U.S. wages by 3.1 log points over 1990-2000.  But Mexico’s small 
relative nominal gains were swamped higher relative inflation in Mexico.  As a result, 
Mexico’s average real CPI wage fell by 17.3 log points.  For mean wages, there thus 
appears to be no evidence of Mexico-U.S. wage convergence. 
The results in Table 4 suggest there has been substantial variation in wage 
changes across labor-market groups in Mexico.  To see this variation more clearly, Table 
5 breaks out changes in real CPI Mexico wages and real relative CPI Mexico-U.S. wages 
for the sample of cohorts by age, education, and region.  Real Mexico wages and real 
Mexico-U.S. wages fall least for younger cohorts.  Young women are the only cohort to 
experience real wage gains both in absolute terms and relative to the United States.  From 
Table 3, it is not surprising to see that more educated workers have higher wage growth.  
Men with 13 or more years of education have positive real wage gains, but only males in 
the 13-15 years of education cohort have real wages gains relative to the United States.  
Women with 12 or more years of education have real absolute and relative wage gains, 
again with the 13-15 years of education cohort showing the strongest gains.   
Turning to regions, we see that on average all regions show real absolute and 
relative wage declines.  These declines are smallest in the border region and largest in the   20
south and the Yucatan.  In Table 3, more educated workers and workers in the border 
region were among those with the highest wages in 1990.  The results in Table 5 suggest 
that young, highly educated workers living in the border region had the strongest wage 
growth during the 1990’s.  Together, these two findings suggest there was little wage 
convergence across labor market groups during the 1990’s.  This lack of convergence is 
consistent with Chiquiar’s (2001) results on the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. 
 
Estimation Results on Mexico-U.S. Wage Convergence 
  To examine the contribution of economic openness to changes in Mexico’s wage 
structure, I estimate regressions of wage changes for the panel of synthetic cohorts.  The 
dependent variable is the 1990-2000 change in log wages by Mexican cohort.  The 
independent variables are drawn from the following set:  the 1990 log wage for the 
Mexican cohort; the 1990 log wage for the same age-education U.S. cohort; the 1990-
2000 change in log wages for the U.S. cohort; dummies variables for age, education 
level, and region; and measures of regional exposure to globalization. 
  I begin by replicating the specification in Robertson (2000), in which the 
independent variables are the log difference in lagged Mexico and U.S. wages and the log 
change in U.S. wages.  He allows regression coefficients to differ between border and 
interior regions, in order to capture possibly stronger links between Mexican and U.S. 
labor markets for Mexican regions closer to the United States.  Similarly, I interact 
regressors with a dummy variable for border states. 
  Table 6a reports the regression results for males and Table 6b reports the 
regression results for females.  In column one of Table 6a, the regressors are the 1990   21
difference in log Mexico and U.S. wages, the 1990-2000 change in log U.S. wages, the 
interactions of the wage variables with the border dummy, and region dummy variables.  
The coefficient on the 1990 difference in Mexico-U.S. wages indicates whether there is 
wage convergence between Mexico and the United States.  In column one, this 
coefficient is negative, small in magnitude, and imprecisely estimated.  However, the 
interaction between this wage variable and the border dummy is negative and precisely 
estimated.   For border states, but not for interior states, wage growth is higher for cohorts 
where initial Mexico wages are lower relative to U.S. wages.  This is consistent with 
convergence between Mexico and U.S. wages in Mexican border states.   
There is a strong positive correlation between wage growth in Mexico and wage 
growth in the United States.  The precisely estimated coefficient of 1.3 indicates that 
Mexican wages increase more than one for one with increases in U.S. wages.  This is 
consistent with labor markets in Mexico and the United States being integrated, through 
some combination of trade, investment, and migration flows.  The border interaction with 
this variable is positive, though imprecisely estimated, showing weak evidence that 
Mexico-U.S. integration is stronger in border states than in interior states.   
The large coefficient on U.S. wage growth is surprising and invites skepticism.  
One concern about the specification in column one is that by forcing the coefficients on 
1990 Mexico wages and 1990 U.S. wages to be equal and of opposite sign we are 
possibly convoluting Mexico-U.S. wage convergence with convergence or divergence in 
wages across Mexican cohorts.  To address this issue, in column two I add the 1990 log 
Mexico wage, and its interaction with the border dummy, as regressors.  It is now the 
case that the coefficients on the difference in 1990 Mexico-U.S. wages and the border   22
interaction with this variable are statistically insignificant.  This is evidence against 
Mexico-U.S. wage convergence.  The coefficient on 1990 Mexico wages is positive and 
precisely estimated and the border interaction with this variable is negative and precisely 
estimated.  What this suggests is that during the 1990’s interior regions had higher wage 
growth for cohorts with higher initial wages.  In other words, there was wage divergence 
in interior regions, but not in the border region.  This evidence of growing wage 
dispersion is not surprising, given the rising returns to skill evident in Table 3.  Overall, 
evidence of Mexico-U.S. wage convergence appears to be fragile.  This confirms the 
impression from mean relative wage changes in Table 4. 
  In column three, I examine the sensitivity of changes in Mexico wages to changes 
in U.S. wages by adding dummy variables for three age categories (16-24 years of age is 
the excluded category) and dummy variables for five education categories (0-4 years of 
schooling is the excluded category) to the regression.  The dummy variables for age are 
individually and jointly statistically insignificant.  After controlling for education and 
U.S. cohort wage changes, there appear to be no age-specific wage changes in Mexico.  
The dummy variables for education are positive and precisely estimated, with larger 
magnitudes for higher education levels that suggest rising returns to schooling. 
With controls for age and education included, the coefficient on U.S. wage 
changes becomes small and imprecisely estimated.  Since U.S. wages vary only by age 
and education, the only variation left in U.S. wage changes after including age and 
education dummies are age-specific changes in the returns to education.  The results 
suggest that it is the commonality in overall changes in returns to education that account 
for the strong positive correlation between Mexico and U.S. wage changes.  These results   23
are not evidence against Mexico-U.S. labor market integration.  Instead, they imply that 
the mechanisms that link wages in Mexico and the United States (be they trade, FDI, 
and/or migration) work through broad changes in the returns to education. 
 
Estimation Results for Regional Exposure to Globalization 
  In column four of Table 6a, I add controls for regional exposure to globalization 
to the specification.  To control for regional variation in business cycles, I also include 
the log change in state real GDP as a regressor.  I include six measures of regional 
exposure to foreign trade and investment.  The share of manufacturing in state GDP and 
the share of agriculture in state GDP control for variation across regions in industrial 
specialization in traded goods.  The share of net foreign direct investment flows in state 
GDP controls for how attractive the state is to multinational enterprises.  The state share 
of national maquiladora employment controls for the attractiveness of the state to foreign 
firms that specialize in export assembly operations.  Some but not all FDI is in 
maquiladoras.  Imports as a share of state GDP capture the exposure of the state to 
foreign trade (similar measures for exports are unavailable).  Distance to the United 
States (nearest U.S. border crossing) captures physical proximity to U.S. markets. 
Several estimation issues merit comment.  Most globalization variables are in 
terms of shares averaged over the 1990’s, rather than as changes in shares, to avoid 
introducing simultaneity into the regression.  Average shares of FDI, imports, 
manufacturing, or agriculture in GDP capture cross-section differences in regional 
exposure to globalization.  Changes in shares would capture state specific globalization 
shocks that might be correlated with unobserved shocks to wages.  By regressing changes   24
in wages on average cross-sectional characteristics, I capture transitional dynamics in 
state wages associated with adjustment to NAFTA (and other shocks).  Results are 
similar results when shares in the initial period are used instead of average shares. 
I include one measure of regional opportunities to migrate to the United States.  
Some background is helpful to understand this measure.  A large literature documents 
that some Mexican states are more likely than others to send migrants to the United 
States and have been for many decades (e.g., Woodruff and Zenteno 2002).  These states 
are mostly in agricultural regions in western Mexico.  They are neither the poorest states 
in the country nor the states that are closest to the United States.  Most research attributes 
these migration patterns to longstanding regional networks that help Mexican workers 
find jobs in the United States.  The persistence of these migration networks suggests that 
historical migration flows are a good indicator of current regional opportunities for 
migration abroad.  The measure I use is the share of the 1960 state population that 
migrated to the United States over the period 1955-1959.  I obtain similar results for 
current migration flows.
6  Historical measures reduce concerns about endogeneity. 
Column four of Table 6a reports the results.  Wage changes are uncorrelated with 
the share of state GDP in manufacturing or in agriculture.  It appears that industrial 
specialization (at least measured at this aggregate level) is not associated with changes in 
regional wage differences.  Mexican regions with larger manufacturing sectors do have 
higher wage levels but did not enjoy higher wage growth in the 1990’s. 
There are strong positive correlations between wage growth and the share of FDI 
and between wage growth the share of imports in state GDP.  It appears that states with 
                                                 
6 As one indication of this, the correlation between the shares of the state population that migrated to the 
United States over the period 1995-2000 and over the period 1955-1959 is 0.68.     25
greater exposure to multinational firms and/or with greater exposure to foreign trade 
enjoyed higher wage growth in the 1990’s.  This suggests, perhaps not surprisingly, that 
regions with better access to global markets for goods and capital had larger increases in 
the demand for labor during the 1990’s.  The correlation between wage changes and the 
state share of national maquiladora employment is positive but statistically insignificant.  
What this may suggest is that, controlling for FDI inflows (and for state proximity to the 
United States), there is nothing special about a state having a particular concentration in 
export assembly operations.  What matters is overall access to foreign capital. 
There is a strong positive correlation between wage changes and historical state 
migration rates to the United States.  States with better opportunities for migration abroad 
had higher wage growth during the 1990’s.  This suggests that migration abroad puts 
upward pressure on wages in the region from which workers were drawn.   
Regional exposure to globalization appears to account for a large portion of 
regional wage differentials.  To see this clearly, compare results in columns three and 
four of Table 6a.  The regression in column three includes controls for age, education, 
lagged Mexico and U.S. wages, and U.S. wage growth.  In this regression coefficients on 
regional dummy variables are large and statistically significant.  When I introduce the 
globalization measures in column four the magnitudes of these coefficients fall 
considerably and they become individually and jointly statistically insignificant.  The 
regional characteristics that matter for wage in Mexico during the 1990’s appear to be 
those related to regional exposure to foreign trade, investment, and migration. 
  The results for females are shown in Table 6b.  With a few exceptions, the results 
for males and females are similar.  For females, there remains the concern that changes in   26
their labor-force participation may complicate analysis of their wage changes.  For 
women, there is stronger evidence of wage convergence between Mexico and the United 
States (columns one and two).  For women, as for men, there is evidence of wage 
divergence in interior regions of the country, a strong positive correlation between 
Mexico wage growth and U.S. wage growth, and strong positive correlations between 
wage growth and the share of FDI in state GDP and historical state migration rates to the 
United States.  There is no positive correlation between wage growth and the import 
share of GDP, as there is for men.  Also distinct from men, the globalization variables do 
not render regional dummy variables statistically insignificant.   
  For males and females, I have estimated alternative specifications to gauge the 
robustness of the findings.  The results on the globalization variables are robust to (a) 
allowing for interactions between returns to schooling and either border dummies or 
distance to the United States, (b) using as the dependent variable changes in Mexico 
wages minus changes in U.S. wages, and (c) measuring U.S. wages using data on the four 
U.S. border states only rather than data for the U.S. as a whole.  
 
IMPLICATIONS OF MEXICO’S EXPERIENCE FOR AN FTAA 
In this paper, I have surveyed recent literature on the impact of trade and 
investment liberalization in Mexico on wages in the country and examined recent 
changes in the country’s wage structure.  Over the last two decades, Mexico has 
dramatically opened its economy to the rest of the world.  During this period, Mexico has 
experienced three significant changes in its wage structure:  (a) overall wage levels have 
had large temporary declines, usually following a macroeconomic contraction, (b) wages   27
in states on the Mexico-U.S. border have increased relative to wages in the rest of the 
country, and (c) there has been a sustained increase in the returns to skill in the country, 
leading to an overall increase in wage inequality. 
The breadth of Mexico’s reforms complicates identifying their effects on labor 
markets in the country.  Compounding these problems are the effects of Mexico’s recent 
macroeconomic instability.  Nevertheless, a number of important lessons emerge from 
Mexico’s experience for how economic integration with other countries, and in particular 
with a large, rich neighbor, impacts labor markets in a developing country.  These lessons 
are useful for gauging how an FTAA might affect other Latin American countries. 
The liberalization of barriers to foreign trade and investment appears to have 
contributed to an increase in the relative demand for skill in Mexico.  Recent literature 
suggests that tariff reductions increased relative wages for skilled workers, increased 
foreign investment raised the relative demand for skilled labor, and tariff and quota 
reductions altered inter-industry wage differentials.  Mexico’s economic opening thus 
appears to have raised the premium paid to skilled workers and reduced rents in 
industries that prior to reform paid their workers relatively high wages.  Both of these 
outcomes have increased in wage dispersion in the country. 
One factor that contributed to how trade affected wages in Mexico was that prior 
to trade reform, the country had relatively high tariffs on less-skill-intensive industries.  
These industries thus bore the brunt of adjustment to Mexico’s economic opening.   
Similar tariff adjustments following an FTAA are unlikely to be a common occurrence in 
the rest of Latin America.  One reason for this is that many countries have already 
engaged in some degree of unilateral trade liberalization.  Columbia, for instance,   28
reduced its trade barriers in the early 1990s.  As in Mexico, trade reform in Columbia led 
to larger tariff reductions in less-skill-intensive industries (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2001).  
Thus, the shock of trade reform related to tariff reductions in low-skill industries may 
have already been delivered in many Latin American countries. 
  In the 1990’s, Mexico consolidated its economic opening by signing and enacting 
NAFTA. The decade saw further increases in the premium paid to workers in Mexican 
states on the U.S. border and in the premium paid to more-skilled workers.  Following 
Mexico’s peso crisis of 1994-1995, real wage levels declined both in absolute terms and 
relative to the United States.  Increases in the returns to education during the 1990’s in 
Mexico were nationwide and appeared to follow closely increases in the returns to 
education in the United States.  Partial labor-market integration between Mexico and the 
United States is a likely explanation for these cross-border wage co-movements.   
Changes in regional wage differentials in Mexico appear to be explained almost entirely 
by regional variation in exposure to foreign markets.  Wage growth has been much 
stronger in regions with higher levels of FDI, higher levels of exposure to foreign trade, 
and higher rates of migration to the United States. 
Overall, the workers in Mexico that have fared the best in the country’s newly 
globalized economy are those with relatively high skill levels living in regions with 
relatively good access to foreign markets.  Less-skilled workers and workers in regions 
with relatively poor access to foreign markets have fared poorly.  This aspect of Mexico’s 
experience with globalization holds important lessons for an FTAA.  Multinational firms 
and firms in export-intensive sectors appear to have relatively strong demand for more-
skilled labor and appear to place a premium on locating in regions with relatively high-  29
quality transportation and communication infrastructure.  In Mexico, NAFTA appeared to 
fortify incentives for FDI.  If an FTAA does the same in the rest of Latin America, it is 
likely to be skilled workers who benefit first and in particular those living in larger cities, 
or near international ports or airports.  At least in the initial periods of adjustment to trade 
reform, the effects of greater economic openness appear to be greater dispersion in wages 
(with unknown effects on average wage levels).  This is an unfortunate message for a 
region with already high levels of inequality.   
A related lesson from Mexico’s adjustment to NAFTA is that FDI appears to play 
an important role in shaping the pattern of specialization that emerges in an economy 
following a reduction in trade barriers.   Much of Mexico’s export growth has occurred in 
maquiladoras, whose expansion was made possible by a combination of lower trade 
barriers and relaxed restrictions on FDI in Mexico and tariff breaks on imports with U.S. 
content in the United States.  If an FTAA does not also address restrictions on FDI in 
Latin America, it may not produce the same degree of regional specialization in export 
production that NAFTA has generated in Mexico.   30
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics 
 
  Males  Males  Females  Females 
        1990 2000 1990 2000 
Age    32.7 33.8 32.7 33.7 
Literate    91.3 94.5 86.3 91.7 
Highest  Grade  0  11.6 5.7 15.6 7.8 
of Schooling  1 to 4  19.1  14.8  19.6  15.9 
Completed  5  to  8  28.6 27.0 28.1 27.7 
(%)  9  13.9 20.4 12.3 18.8 
  10  to  11  7.7 7.2 7.4 6.7 
  12  6.5 10.0 7.6 11.3 
  13  to  15  5.2 4.9 5.1 4.6 
  16+  7.2 9.6 4.0 6.8 
Married    53.7 51.4 53.9 50.3 
Region  Border  17.6 18.6 16.8 17.3 
  North  10.4 10.0 10.3 10.0 
  Center  33.6 32.7 34.3 34.0 
  Capital  23.7 23.8 24.0 24.1 
  Yucatan  4.7 5.4 4.5 5.1 
  South  10.0 9.5 10.0 9.4 
Size  of    500k+  23.9 28.7 24.3 28.7 
Locality  100k-500k 23.5 22.3 24.3 22.7 
  15k-100k  12.9 13.7 13.3 13.9 
  2.5k-15k  13.2 12.8 13.2 13.1 
  <2.5k  26.5 22.5 24.9 21.7 
Migration  Since  Birth 22.4 23.5 23.0 23.9 
  Within  5  Years  5.7 5.7 5.7 5.2 
Self-Employed   22.0  21.3  3.3  7.9 
Wage  Earner    66.1 68.7 20.7 30.9 
Hourly  wage  Current  Prices  1.33 1.80 1.24 1.82 
(US$)  1990  Pesos   1.11   1.13 
  1990  Dollars   1.37   1.38 
N      211,133 265,797 228,964 288,228 
 
This table shows summary statistics on a 1% sample of individuals 16-65 years old in the 1990 and 2000 
Mexico Censo de Poblacio y Vivienda.  Border:  Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, 
Sonora, Tamaulipas; North: Aguascalientes, Baja California Sur, Durango, Nayarit, San Luis Potosi, 
Sinaloa, Zacatecas; Center: Colima, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Michoacan, Morelos, Puebla, Queretaro, 
Tlaxcala, Veracruz; Capital: Federal District, Mexico; South: Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca; Yucatan:   
Campeche, Tabasco, Quintana Roo, Yucatan.   33
Table 2:  Distribution of Employment across Industries 
 
 Males  Males  Females  Females 
    1990 2000 1990 2000 
Agriculture, Mining  28.9  20.7  3.5  4.7 
Manufacturing  20.7 20.0 20.5 19.3 
Trans, Comm, Elec, Water  6.6  7.7  2.2  2.3 
Construction  9.1 11.8 0.9  0.8 
Commerce  12.3 14.3 18.9 23.0 
Public  Administration 3.8 4.2 5.1 4.5 
General  Services  4.1 6.0 6.5 6.3 
Restaurants,  Hotels  2.6 3.6 6.2 7.8 
Social Assistance  5.1  5.1  23.1  16.8 
Repair, Domestic Services  6.8  6.6  13.1  14.5 
 
This table shows the allocation of workers across industries.  See Table 1 for details on the sample.   34
 Table 3a:  OLS Wage Regressions, Males in 1990 and 2000 
               Full Sample    w/o Self-Employed 
 Variable      1990  2000  1990  2000 
  Highest Grade  1 to 4  0.112 0.101 0.092 0.084   
 of  Schooling   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
  Completed  5 to 8  0.255 0.240 0.218 0.213   
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
   9  0.410 0.381 0.373 0.345   
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
    10 to 11  0.553 0.557 0.516 0.516   
     (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
   12  0.686 0.686 0.643 0.645   
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
    13 to 15  0.873 1.006 0.835 0.983   
     (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
   16+  1.221 1.352 1.168 1.329   
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 Age    0.045 0.032 0.042 0.029   
     (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
 Age  Squared/100    -0.047 -0.033 -0.045 -0.031   
     (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
 Married    0.095 0.115 0.090 0.112   
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
  Size of   500k+  0.293 0.308 0.238 0.286   
 Locality    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
   100k-500k  0.243 0.251 0.190 0.233   
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
   15k-100k  0.235 0.162 0.159 0.151   
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
   2.5k-15k 0.164 0.110 0.110 0.10   
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 Border    0.375 0.460 0.260 0.418   
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 North    0.281 0.274 0.150 0.229   
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 Center    0.246 0.225 0.130 0.183   
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 Capital    0.216 0.215 0.114 0.189   













0.084  0.062 -0.028 0.065   
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
 Manufacturing    0.292 0.221 0.220 0.196   
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 Trans,  Comm,    0.328 0.209 0.237 0.172   
 Elec,  Water   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 Construction   0.372 0.263 0.277 0.213   
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 Commerce    0.286 0.134 0.125 0.057   
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 Public  Admin.    0.063 0.185 0.033 0.174   
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 Gen.  Services    0.397 0.277 0.268 0.204   
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
 Restaurants,   0.215 0.127 0.050 0.012 
 Hotels    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
 Soc.  Assist.   0.274 0.375 0.236 0.375   
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 Repair,    0.305 0.153 0.144 0.066   
 Domestic  Serv.    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 N    93,999  121,873  67,409  89,778 
 R-Squared      0.306  0.418  0.295  0.449 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  The sample for the estimation is a 1% random sample of individuals 25-
65 years old from the 1990 and 2000 Mexico Censo de Poblacio y Vivienda.  Individuals with wages in the 
highest or lowest 0.5% of wage values have been dropped (see text for details).  The first two columns 
show results for all wage earners.  The second two columns show results excluding the self-employed.  
Sampling weights were used in the 2000 census but not in the 1990 census.  Accordingly, the 1990 
regressions are unweighted while the 2000 regressions are weighted.  See Table 1 for other details.   36
Table 3b:  OLS Wage Regressions, Females in 1990 and 2000 
               Full Sample    w/o Self-Employed 
 Variable      1990  2000  1990  2000 
  Highest Grade  1 to 4  0.124 0.172  0.092 0.153   
 of  Schooling    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
  Completed  5 to 8  0.224 0.351  0.188 0.312   
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
   9  0.459 0.542  0.438 0.493   
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
    10 to 11  0.592 0.762  0.575 0.726   
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
   12  0.736 0.865  0.718 0.819   
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
    13 to 15  0.877 1.201  0.856 1.167   
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
   16+  1.089 1.398  1.055 1.351   
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
 Age    0.048 0.045  0.043 0.040   
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
 Age  Squared/100    -0.051 -0.046  -0.045 -0.039   
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
 Married    0.121 0.093  0.108 0.101   
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
  Size of   500k+  0.268 0.319  0.184 0.279   
 Locality    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
   100k-500k 0.227 0.266  0.143 0.230   
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
   15k-100k  0.144 0.175  0.052 0.140   
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
   2.5k-15k 0.123 0.131  0.039 0.115   
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
 Border    0.277 0.416  0.235 0.347   
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
 North    0.145 0.202  0.096 0.133   
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
 Center    0.104 0.178  0.066 0.118   
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
 Capital    0.179 0.249  0.145 0.199   













0.00  0.160 -0.026  0.102   
    (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
 Manufacturing    -0.008 0.003  -0.013  0.01 
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
 Trans,  Comm,    0.178 0.227  0.166 0.204   
 Elec,  Water    (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
 Construction    0.287 0.167  0.229 0.129   
    (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
 Commerce    0.007 -0.10  -0.091  -0.101   
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
 Public  Admin.    -0.052 0.171  -0.053 0.162   
    (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
 Gen.  Services    0.183 0.154  0.136 0.111   
    (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
 Restaurants,    0.003 -0.018  -0.111 -0.118   
 Hotels    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
 Soc.  Assist.    0.124 0.310  0.113 0.301   
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
 Repair,    -0.174 -0.135  -0.221 -0.162   
 Domestic  Serv.    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
 N   26,583  47,008  21,988  37,066 
 R-Squared      0.294  0.475  0.329  0.523 
 
See Table 3a for details on the estimation. 
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Table 4:  Changes in Mexico-U.S. Relative Wages, 1990-2000 
 
                   Males                 Females 
   Mean  St. Dev.  Mean  St. Dev. 
      
Change in Log Wages 1990-2000:         
Nominal Mexico Wages  0.291  0.205  0.474  0.258 
Real Mexico Wages (CPI)  -0.190  0.205  -0.006  0.258 
Nominal U.S. Wages  0.260  0.050  0.300  0.055 
Real U.S. Wages (CPI)  -0.016  0.050  0.024  0.055 
      
Change in Log Mexico/U.S.         
Wages  1990-2000:     
Nominal  Wages  0.031 0.192 0.175 0.242 
Real Wages (CPI)  -0.173  0.192  -0.030  0.242 
            
 
This table shows changes in wages for a panel of synthetic cohorts in Mexico and the United States for two 
years (1990, 2000), four 1990 age categories (16-25, 26-35, 36-45, and 46-55 years), seven education 
categories (0-4, 5-8, 9-11, 12, 13-15, and 16+ years of schooling), and Mexico’s 32 states (U.S. cohorts are 
defined for the nation as a whole).  Nominal Mexico and U.S. wages are in terms of current U.S. dollars.   39
 
Table 5:  Change in Log Real CPI Wages, 1990-2000 
 
Real CPI  Age in      Years of          
Wages  1990  Males Females  Education Males Females  Region Males Females
Mexico  16-25 -0.125 0.087  4  -0.341 -0.233  Border  -0.053 0.081 
Mex/US    -0.113 0.020    -0.288 -0.204    -0.041 0.052 
          
Mexico 26-35 -0.182 -0.031  5-8  -0.225 -0.037 North -0.187 0.043 
Mex/US    -0.157 -0.029    -0.204 -0.055    -0.170 0.016 
          
Mexico 36-45 -0.292 -0.150  9-11  -0.141 -0.003 Center -0.222 -0.042 
Mex/US    -0.282 -0.132    -0.132 -0.050    -0.202 -0.065 
          
Mexico 46-55 -0.373 -0.303  12  -0.083 0.043 Capital  -0.193 -0.018 
Mex/US    -0.311 -0.308    -0.076 0.009    -0.183 -0.040 
            
Mexico       13-15  0.105  0.258  Yucatan  -0.273  0.023 
Mex/US         0.118  0.274    -0.252  -0.001 
            
Mexico       16+  0.021  0.129  South  -0.312  -0.142 
Mex/US             -0.067  0.045     -0.285  -0.156 
 
This table shows the mean change in real CPI wages for Mexico and for Mexico relative to the U.S. by age, 
schooling, and region of Mexico.  The sample is the panel of synthetic cohorts.  See Table 4 for details.   40
Table 6a:  Change in Log Wages 1990-2000 for Synthetic Cohorts, Males 
 
              
W
90,MX/W
90,US  -0.027 -0.133 -0.015 -0.027 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.22) (0.17) 
W
00,US/W
90,US  1.276 1.202 -0.046  -0.132 
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.34) (0.27) 
(W
90,MX/W
90,US)*Border  -0.221 -0.067  0.05  0.008 
  (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) 
(W
00,US/W
90,US)*Border  0.446 0.538 0.175 0.186 
  (0.31) (0.31) (0.25) (0.23) 
Border  -0.256 0.033 0.391 0.099 
  (0.21) (0.23) (0.18) (0.19) 
North  0.106 0.106 0.143  0.05 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
Center  0.071 0.072 0.108 0.052 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Capital  0.105 0.098 0.122 -0.022 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Yucatan  0.006 0.005 0.003 -0.015 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
W
90,MX   0.096 -0.277 -0.374 
    (0.03) (0.22) (0.18) 
(W
90,MX)*Border   -0.139 -0.148 -0.133 
    (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Age Cohort 26-35      -0.031 -0.014 
     (0.06)  (0.05) 
Age Cohort 36-45      -0.064 -0.032 
     (0.09)  (0.08) 
Age Cohort 46-55      -0.099 -0.069 
     (0.09)  (0.08) 
Grades 5-8      0.129 0.143 
     (0.04)  (0.03) 
Grades 9-11      0.232 0.264 
     (0.05)  (0.04) 
Grade 12      0.398 0.450 
     (0.11)  (0.09) 
Grade 13-15      0.631 0.697 










  0.708 0.818 
     (0.23)  (0.18) 
State GDP Growth        0.143 
1993-99       (0.14) 
Mfg. Share of State GDP       0.009 
1993-99       (0.16) 
Agr. Share of State GDP       -0.159 
1993-99       (0.32) 
FDI Share of State GDP        2.821 
1994-99       (1.12) 
State Share of Maquila        0.147 
Employment       (0.16) 
Import Share of State GDP        1.506 
1993-99       (0.75) 
Km. to US Border        -0.014 
       (0.01) 
State-US Migration Rate        3.281 
1955-59       (0.46) 
N  728 728 728 728 
R-Squared  0.239 0.254 0.595 0.667 
 
This table shows regressions using as the dependent variable the 1990-2000 change in log wages for 
synthetic age-education-state cohorts of males in Mexico.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  All wage 
measures are in logs as is GDP used to calculate the 1993-1999 change in the variable.  All share measures 
are entered in levels.  See Table 5 for more details on the age and education definitions for the cohorts. 
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Table 6b:  Change in Log Wages 1990-2000 for Synthetic Cohorts, Females 
 
              
W
90,MX/W
90,US  -0.452 -0.80 -0.237 -0.23 
  (0.05) (0.08) (0.25) (0.23) 
W
00,US/W
90,US  1.972 2.046 0.256 0.266 
  (0.24) (0.23) (0.30) (0.28) 
(W
90,MX/W
90,US)*Border  -0.181 0.054 0.216 0.092 
  (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) 
(W
00,US/W
90,US)*Border  -0.689 -0.683 -0.547  -0.62 
  (0.41) (0.40) (0.35) (0.32) 
Border  0.234  0.669 0.90 0.611 
  (0.21) (0.24) (0.21) (0.21) 
North  0.190 0.191 0.172 0.097 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Center  0.116 0.124 0.130 0.118 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) 
Capital  0.198 0.199 0.211 0.119 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) 
Yucatan  0.154 0.149 0.133 0.163 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) 
W
90,MX   0.269 -0.471 -0.516 
    (0.04) (0.25) (0.24) 
(W
90,MX)*Border   -0.167 -0.173 -0.156 
    (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
Age Cohort 26-35      0.011 0.029 
     (0.06)  (0.06) 
Age Cohort 36-45      0.023 0.044 
     (0.08)  (0.07) 
Age Cohort 46-55      -0.069 -0.048 
     (0.08)  (0.08) 
Grades 5-8      0.209 0.211 
     (0.03)  (0.03) 
Grades 9-11      0.361 0.373 
     (0.04)  (0.04) 
Grade 12      0.570 0.590 
     (0.10)  (0.10) 
Grade 13-15      0.870 0.897 









  0.893 0.925 
     (0.22)  (0.21) 
State GDP Growth        -0.069 
1993-99       (0.19) 
Mfg. Share of State GDP       -0.02 
1993-99       (0.20) 
Agr. Share of State GDP       0.459 
1993-99       (0.40) 
FDI Share of State GDP        4.208 
1994-99       (1.38) 
State Share of Maquila        0.211 
Employment       (0.21) 
Import Share of State GDP        -0.326 
1993-99       (0.90) 
Km. to US Border        0.011 
       (0.02) 
State-US Migration Rate        2.287 
1955-59       (0.73) 
N  702 702 702 702 
R-Squared  0.311 0.375 0.624 0.649 
 
See notes to Table 6a. 
 